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Abstract: The study adds to the literature by providing new empirical evidence consistent with
efficiency wage theory, and by providing estimates of the average cost of supervising a worker
by industry.  This research uses the 1996 wave of the NLSY and incorporates estimates of
supervision cost computed from industry classifications. We further detect presence of no gender
differences neither in risk-averseness nor in productivity gains associated with cost of
supervision and performance-based pay.
* Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Study Group # 9 (Pay Systems) panel
(Atlanta, Georgia  -- January 3, 2002) affiliated with the International Industrial Relations
Association,, at the Southern Economic Conference (New Orleans, LA -- November 1999), at
the Study Group # 9 (Pay Systems) panel affiliated with the International Industrial Relations
Association, and at the NAEFA Roundtable session on Firm Management and Financing
(Boston, MA -- January 2000). A part of the paper was completed when Wunnava was a visiting
professor of economics at the economics department of UNC-Chapel Hill during the academic
year 1999-2000.  We like to thank Eric Johnson, David Levine, John Heywood, Jeffrey Pliskin,
Daniel Mitchell, Daniel Hamermesh, and William Warren for their valuable comments. The
usual disclaimer applies."The Trade-Off Between Supervision Cost and Performance Based Pay:
Does Gender Matter?"
I. Introduction
Evidence  from  past  studies  shows  that productivity  may  increase  with  greater
supervisory intensity (i.e., external supervision) and/or with greater "internal" (or self-)
supervision [Leonard (1987)].  In the efficiency wage literature internal supervision may
take the form of higher wages since higher wages result in higher costs of shirking for
workers.  Thus, in efficiency wage models a principal can induce agents to provide effort
via higher wages  or  greater  monitoring.    Several papers  have examined  the effect  of
monitoring on wages and have concluded that workers earn more  where  monitoring  is
more difficult [e.g., Lindberg and Snower (1987); Ewing and Payne (1999)].  It has also
been found that workers who are employed in jobs that have pay based on performance
earn more [Brown (1990, 1992); Ewing (1996); Parent (1999); Booth and Frank (1999)].
In these situations, workers who provide more effort are rewarded with higher pay.  In the
model presented in  this  paper,  monitoring  and  performance  based  pay  are  treated  as
substitutes in the production  process.    The principal  can buy  self-supervision through
performance based pay or decrease the likelihood of shirking by  devoting resources  to
external supervision.  A profit-maximizing firm will choose the optimal mix of internal-
external supervision.  This paper  presents  a  simple model where  internal  and  external
supervision measures may be substitutes and then empirically tests the model using a new
measure of the cost of supervising workers to determine if the evidence supports this claim.
Moreover, based on the work of Goldin (1986) and Bulow and Summers (1986), it is
often thought  that firms  may treat  males and  females  differently  with  regard to  wage
premium and supervisory intensity.  The model in this paper lends itself to testing for the
possible presence of gender differences.
A  common  practice  in  efficiency  wage  studies  is  to  use  firm  size  and/or
establishment size as a proxy for monitoring cost; however, it is both desirable and more
appropriate to use a dollar figure that represents what it really costs a firm to supervise a
typical worker.  While some studies have attempted to measure supervision intensity or
cost, none have pinned down a good estimate of this type of supervisory cost [e.g., Evans
and Leighton (1989); Robinson and Wunnava (1991); Ewing and Payne (1999)].   The
measure of monitoring cost used in this paper is unique and comes from the 1996 wave of
the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY) data set.  The NLSY allows for the
construction  of  a  new  measure of  monitoring  intensity  that  is  given  in  dollars.    As
described below, this paper provides industry level average  estimates of what it costs a
firm (in dollars) to supervise a typical worker.  This variable is then incorporated into the
wage  regressions  along  with  information  on  whether  or  not  the  worker  receives
performance based pay.  The results indicate that supervision cost and performance based2
pay are positively related to the wage a worker receives.  The evidence also suggests that
these two variables are substitutes  in  the production process  (i.e.,  there is  a  trade-off
between supervision cost and internal supervision).  However, contrary, to conventional
wisdom, we do not find evidence of any gender differences.  This latter finding suggests
that, with regards to supervision and performance pay, firms appear to treat males  and
females similarly.
1  In particular, results are not consistent with the argument that it may be
more costly to supervise men than women, nor that women may be more risk averse than
men.
II. Incentive Plans and Increased Productivity
Under efficiency wage theory, a wage rate above the going market rate works as a
monetary incentive to promote higher levels of effort/productivity and decrease ‘shirking’
on  the  part  of  the  worker.  Thus,  worker  compensation  becomes  correlated  with
performance  on-the-job.  Incentive  payment  systems  provide  the  same  relationship.
Basically, incentive plans tie pay directly to individual or group performance. Although
some systems might offer a certain base wage to employees, there still remains a variable
element to compensation which hinges upon output [Mitchell et al. (1990), p.21]. This
certain type of plan is designed to accommodate those workers who are at least slightly risk
averse and do not like the concept of an entirely variable income stream but who do wish to
be rewarded for their own productivity.
According to Mitchell et al. (1990) workers under incentive plans consistently earn
higher wages  compared  to  workers  who  are compensated  merely  by  the hour.  Some
economists maintain that it is difficult to determine whether firms are receiving higher levels
of  productivity  from  workers  employed  under  incentive  plans.
2  However,  firms  in  a
competitive market must be receiving some form of a return for implementing these types
of systems or else they would have to eliminate these plans in order to remain competitive.
In their wage survey of workers in 11 different industries, Mitchell et al. (1990) found that
employees  under  incentives  enjoyed  a  wage  advantage  of  14%  over  other  workers.
Moreover,  other studies
3  indicate  that incentives  do  tend  to  motivate  workers.  When
incentives are introduced properly, there  is  generally  a  rise  of  10-25%  in  productivity
gains. Yet, in some instances, effective incentive plans are difficult to implement. In the
situation where employees are awarded bonuses for reaching a set goal, some workers may
attempt  to  keep production norms  low  in  order  to  keep the goals  from  being raised.
Employees may also choose not to perform other activities in the workplace that are not
                                                
1 This concurs with the contention of Booth and Frank (1999).
2 Parent (1999) concludes that the wage effect of performance based pay, as measured by piece rates, stems
from two sources: selection and incentives.
3 See for example, Seiler (1984) and Lazear (2000a,b).3
directly necessary for producing output, such as cleaning up the work area, etc. Therefore
incentive plans are most valuable in occupations where employees either work individually
or  in  small groups  while the work  is  stable and  does  not  need  constant  revision  of
standards [Mitchell et al. (1990), p. 66].
Overall, incentive plans appear to enhance productivity. Ehrenberg and Bognanno
(1990)  conducted  a  study  of  the  1984  men's  PGA  tour  in  which  they  examined
tournaments and tournament-style payment schemes. They discovered that tournaments do
have incentive effects in that higher prize levels are positively related to lower golf scores
with  scores  being affected  to  a  greater  degree in  the later  rounds  of  the  tournament.
Bognanno and Ehrenberg found some support for the hypothesis that better players tend to
be more responsive to financial incentives (p. 1322).
III. Theoretical Framework
The model presented here comes from Robinson and Wunnava (1991) and has its
origins in Bulow and Summers (1986).  The latter paper derives the no-shirking condition
for workers  in  the primary sector under  standard assumptions  that workers  maximize
lifetime utility, have dis-utility associated with effort, and may be fired if caught shirking.
From Bulow and Summers (1986) wage premium expression, Robinson and  Wunnava
(1991) develop a simple efficiency wage model.  Let y denote output, w the wage paid, p
the wage premium (which elicits internal supervision as it raises compensation above the
alternative), S the amount of supervision (which provides external supervision), c per unit
cost of supervision (it is assumed that supervision  is  costly in  that firms  must  devote
resources to its provision), N the amount of labor, and e denotes work effort. Assuming
the output price is normalized to one, then firms maximize the following profit ( ) function
by choosing N, p, and S:
cS N p w y - + - = ) (
where
) , ( e N f y =  and  ) , ( S p g e =
f  and  g  are assumed  to  be  well-behaved  functions in  the sense  that both  increase  at
decreasing rates in terms of their arguments.  Note that gpS may be <, >, or = 0; however,
in the case where gpS < 0, p and S are substitutes.
As discussed in Robinson and Wunnava (1991), several researchers have argued
that gp(p, S) is larger for males than for females (i.e., the marginal gains in work intensity
from increasing wage premia will be larger for males than for females), perhaps due to
lesser degree of job attachment by females [Goldin (1986); Bulow and Summers (1986)].
Under these conditions, females are not expected to be as responsive to wage premium as
males,  and  males will have larger  wage  premium  than  females  for  the  same  effort.4
Alternatively, if employers perceive females as easier to manage than males, then the cost
of supervision will be higher for males.  In either case, firms  treat  males and  females
differently and, therefore, females will receive more supervision and lower wage premium
than males for the same work effort. However, if women seem to be more risk averse than
men [Johnson and Powell  (1994);  Jianakoplos and  Bernasek (1998);  and  Senden  and
Surette (1998)] employers may be inclined to offer higher relative wages to attract women
(than men) given earnings uncertainty under performance based pay structure [McGoldrick
(1995)].
Accordingly, in terms of the empirical work,  supervision  cost  and  performance
based pay should  be  positively  related  to  the wage  received. However,  the foregoing
discussion also suggests that the effect of supervision cost may be larger for males than for
females (i.e., it may be more costly to supervise men than women), and there may be a
larger impact of performance based pay on wages of females than males (i.e., women may
be more risk averse than men).  In the next section we discuss our empirical analysis.
IV. Data, Empirical Model, and Discussion of Results
The data are from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY) which has
interviewed  respondents  annually  since  1979.  The  initial  wave  contained  12,686
individuals between the ages of 14 and 21.  The sample consists of those who worked for
pay in the year prior to the 1996 wave.
Workers are first assigned to an industry using one digit SIC codes.  A total of ten
industry  classifications  (refer to  Table  1)  are used.  To  construct the supervision  cost
measure workers are further identified as being either a supervisor or non-supervisor.  For
each supervisor, the NLSY provides information as to the number of workers they monitor
on a daily basis.  Each supervisor's hourly wage is then divided by the number of workers
he/she monitors.  The average of this number, by industry, is computed and used as an
estimate of the average cost of supervising a worker for that industry.  Table 1 provides
these estimates of average cost of  supervision  by  industry.
4  Table  1  also  presents  the
proportion of non-supervisory female (male) workers in each industry group. The average
hourly cost of supervision ranges from $2.50 (wholesale and retail -- where proportion of
males [.53] is slightly higher than females [.47]) to $8.84 (finance, insurance, and real
estate -- where proportion of females [.66] is substantially higher than males [.34]). We
also note that construction industry is dominated by males and professional, entertainment
and recreational services industry is dominated by females.
                                                
4 The actual wage of a respondent's supervisor is not given in the NLSY. Due to this data constraint we
devised an alternative supervisory cost variable as explained above.5
In order to examine the effects of supervision cost and performance based pay on
wages, attention is restricted to the group of non-supervisors.  The resulting sample size is
1492.  A base log wage (lnW) model (equation 1) is proposed for all non-supervisors:
5
(1) lnWj = b0+a0(female)j+b1(performance pay)j+b2(supervision cost)j+
b3(establishment size)j+b4(performance pay*supervision cost)j+X +uj
where performance pay is a binary variable (= 1 if the respondent reports earnings  are
based on piece rate, bonus, commission, or tips; 0 otherwise),  supervision  cost  is  the
average cost of supervising a worker, supervision cost*performance pay is an interaction
term, and female is a gender indicator variable (= 1 if the respondent is
female and 0 if male).  The establishment size variable (defined as the actual number
of  employees  at the place  where  the respondent works)  is  commonly  used  to  proxy
monitoring cost and used in efficiency wage studies.
6  The vector X is a set of standard
human capital and demographic variables.
7  Based on our earlier discussion, it is expected
that b1 > 0 and b2 > 0; and a finding of b4 < 0 provides evidence that performance based
pay and supervision cost are substitutes.  Moreover,  the existing literature  [Booth  and
Frank (1999); Evans and Leighton (1989); Ewing and Payne (1999); Wunnava and Ewing
(1999)] suggests that b3 should be greater than zero.
Since previous research suggests that gender differences in supervision cost and
risk aversion may exist, equation 1 is augmented with a set of gender interaction terms as
specified in equation 2:





Table 2 presents variable means and summary regression results of the log wage
models specified in equation 1 (Panel A), and equation 2 (Panel B).  Panel A indicates that
                                                
5 The model is estimated using ordinary least squares regression and is corrected for heteroscedasticity.
Results are for full time employed persons only.
6 For more on the use of employer size in the efficiency wage literature see Ewing and Payne (1999).
7 These variables include AFQT score, tenure (and its square), a measure of actual work experience (and its
square), years of education, race, marital status, number of children, occupation, union, region of country, and
urban residence. For a detailed description of the control variables used in this study see Wunnava and Ewing
(1999). The industry dummies have been omitted from the empirical specification to alleviate the problem of
multicollinearity given our derivation of industry specific average cost of supervising a worker included in the
model.6
males enjoy 16.43% wage premium, and workers whose pay is based on performance earn
about 8.9 percent
8 more than otherwise identical workers.  It is also found that an increase
in supervision cost is associated with  higher worker  pay,  ceteris  paribus.    These two
outcomes are in accord with the predictions of efficiency wage models – workers will earn
higher wages  at firms  where  monitoring  is  more  costly  and  firms  can  buy  internal
supervision through the use of performance based pay. A particularly interesting finding is
that the interaction term (performance pay*supervision cost) is negative and significant at
the p=0.03 level.  The latter finding may be interpreted as evidence consistent with the
notion that performance based pay (i.e., internal supervision) and supervision cost (i.e.,
external supervision) are substitutes in the production process.  Thus, firms will choose an
optimal mix of internal-external supervision.  Note also that the above findings hold while
controlling for establishment size which is found to be positively associated with the wage
paid, consistent with what is commonly found elsewhere in the literature.
The results  reported in  Panel B  provide information  regarding possible  gender
differences.  The coefficients of performance pay, supervision cost, and establishment size
for the comparison group (i.e., males) have the anticipated signs and are indeed statistically
significant. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term performance pay*supervision
cost also has the expected sign and is marginally significant.  Qualitatively, the signs of the
estimated coefficients on the female indicator variable and the corresponding interactions
with  performance  pay,  supervision  cost,  establishment  size,  and  performance
pay*supervision cost  are also  in  agreement  with  the  theoretical  predictions  based  on
previous research.
9 One could note from our complex model 2 that the estimated male wage
premium, and performance based wage premium
10 is identical to one reported in our simple
model 1.  Based on this result, and contrary to previous research, it appears that gender
differences in supervision cost and performance based pay may not exist.
It is logical to assume that a profit-maximizing firm will set the ratio of marginal
benefits of wage premia (in terms of effort) equal to the marginal benefits of supervision to
the costs of supervision.  Thus,  generally  speaking,  one  would  expect  that increasing
supervision costs would lead to higher wage premia.  If there is a difference between males
                                                
8 [¶lnW/¶_ performance pay) = b1 + b4(supervision cost)] evaluated at the sample mean of supervision cost
= [.2623716 - .0334(5.19)] = .089.
9  However, these variables are collectively significant.  A joint F-test of the null hypothesis that there are
no differences between males and females in the estimated  model,  that  is,  H0:  a0=a1=a2=a3=a4=0,
yielded an observed F-value (5, 1458) = 10.96 with corresponding p-value = 0.00.
10 [¶lnW/¶  female)  =  a0 + a1(performance  pay)  +  a2(supervision  cost)  +  a3(establishment  size)  +
a4(performance pay*supervision cost)] evaluated at the same mean values = [-.1184591 + .0663192(.186) -
.009229(5.190) - .0000112(572.81) - .0043(.963)]  =  -.164468.    [¶lnW/¶  performance  pay)    =  b1  +
a1(female) + b4(supervision cost) + a4(female*supervision cost)] evaluated at the same mean values = [-
.2428226 + .0663192(.493) - .0340101(5.190)  - .0043(2.658)] = -.0892.7
and females in either their responsiveness to wage premia or to supervision, the trade-off
will occur at different rates.  In fact, our evidence suggests that the effect of supervision
cost on wages is no different for males than for females.
11
Interestingly,  the  reported  results  in  Panel  B  do  not  provide  support  to  the
commonly held belief that women may be more risk averse than men.
12  In other words,
women do not appear to be any different than men in terms of preferring a steady flow of
earnings more than an uncertain flow of higher expected earnings, the latter of which is a
common feature of performance based pay schemes.
13
V. Conclusion
This  study  adds  to  the literature  by  providing new  empirical  evidence  on  the
existence of the wage effects of performance based pay and the cost of worker supervision.
The predictions  are consistent with  those  from  efficiency  wage  theory.    Unlike other
studies in this area,  this  research uses  the 1996  wave  of  the NLSY  and  incorporates
estimates of average supervision cost computed from industry classifications.  Consistent
with previous research, we find that wages are positively related to performance based pay.
We also find that higher pay is associated with greater cost of supervision.  However, in
contrast to some widely held beliefs, our results do not support the hypothesis that males
are more costly to supervise than females nor that females are more risk averse than males.
This  paper  also  documents  a  new  finding,  in  particular,  that  internal  and  external
supervision measures appear to be substitutes in the production process.
We find no evidence of gender differences in productivity gains associated with
performance based pay and cost of supervision.  While the findings imply that employers
should consider the incentive  effects of  supervision  and  performance  based  pay  when
constructing  pay  schemes,  there  is  no  need  for  employers  to  devote  resources  to
constructing  gender-specific  payment  mechanisms.    Our evidence  suggests  that profit-
maximizing firms should treat males and females equally and develop gender-neutral pay
schemes.
                                                
11 Note the negative but insignificant coefficient for the female*supervision cost variable.
12 McGoldrick (1995) concluded that women tend to receive higher compensating wages for uncertainty
than their male counterparts.
13 Note that the estimated coefficient on the interaction term female*performance pay
is greater than zero but is insignificant.8
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Table 1: Average Cost Per Hour of Supervising a Worker by Industry







































































Notes: Data are from the 1996 wave of the NLSY.  Industry is determined using one digit SIC
code.  Supervision cost is computed based on wages of respondents identified as supervisors
and the number of workers that these supervisors supervise on a daily basis (which can take
on values of 1, 2, 3,…,n).  The wage of each supervisor is divided by the number of workers
supervised  by  that  supervisor  to  obtain  a  (supervisor-specific)  cost  of  supervision.    For
example, if supervisor A earns $n/hour and supervises m workers, then the cost per hour of
each worker supervised by A is $(n/m).  The industry average of this cost is calculated and
used as the cost of supervising (non-supervisor) workers in that industry.  Standard deviation
is  given  in  parentheses.    Proportion  female  (male)  indicates  the  proportion  of  non-
supervisory workers in that industry that are female (male).  The number of females (males)
is given in parentheses.11
Table 2: Summary of Results
(Dependent variable is lnW º natural log of hourly wage)
A. Equation 1 Results
Coefficient t-stat. P>|t| Mean
female -0.1643396 -7.224 0.000 0.493
performance pay 0.2623714 3.059 0.002 0.186
supervision cost 0.0318522 3.825 0.000 5.190
establishment size 0.0000148 3.245 0.001 572.810
performance pay*supervision cost -0.0339679 -2.143 0.032 0.963
F( 29, 1462)  =  41.60
Prob > F  =  0.0000
Adj R-squared  =  0.4412
B. Equation 2 Results
Coefficient t-stat. P>|t| Mean
female -0.1184591 -1.329 0.184 0.493
performance pay 0.2428226 2.020 0.044 0.186
female*performance pay 0.0669132 0.385 0.701 0.079
supervision cost 0.0373740 2.884 0.004 5.190
female*supervision cost -0.0092290 -0.558 0.577 2.658
establishment size 0.0000224 2.734 0.006 572.810
female*establishment size -0.0000112 -1.156 0.248 332.650
performance pay*supervision cost -0.0340101 -1.488 0.137 0.963
female*performance pay*supervision cost -0.0043000 -0.135 0.893 0.422
F( 29, 1462)  =  36.60
Prob > F  =  0.0000
Adj R-squared  =  0.4407
Notes:  Data are from the 1996 wave of the NLSY.  Number of observations is 1492.  The
mean of the dependent variable is 2.438.  Control variables for workers include education,
tenure (also square term), actual experience (also square term), percentile score on AFQT,
occupation, region of country, urban residence, union, marital status, number of children, and
race. Full results can be obtained upon request.